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MOLECULES AND CONFLICT: CANCER,
PATENTS, AND WOMEN’S HEALTH
EILEEN M. KANE*

Effective health care for women relies on a nexus of scientific,
medical, and legal regimes. Intellectual property law offers incentives for
creative accomplishments, and patent law, in particular, offers incentives
for the development of medical innovations. This Article examines an
intersection of women’s health and the patent system. Breast cancer is the
most common cancer in women and has been the focus of sustained basic
and clinical scientific research. The Article presents an analysis of patentrelated issues that have accompanied the development of leading
compounds for the prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of breast cancer,
in particular, Taxol, Tamoxifen, Herceptin, and the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes. Collectively, these molecules track the intellectual development of
the breast cancer research field. As a result, the patent issues range from
those that arise in a mature pharmaceutical market to those that can only
emerge from new advances in biotechnology.
Through the lens of a specific disease-centered analysis,
paradigmatic conflicts related to pharmaceutical patents are illustrated
here: the management of public-private technology transfer efforts between
government and industry, and the intellectual property conflicts that can
arise over an unpatentable compound (Taxol); initiatives to accelerate
generic pharmaceutical development and the antitrust concerns raised by
collusion between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies in
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patent settlements (Taxol, Tamoxifen); the resolution of patent rights to
novel molecular targets between competing biotechnology companies, and
the demand for the establishment of a regulatory pathway for biogenerics
(Herceptin); the controversy over the patenting of DNA, especially genes,
and whether such patent rights interfere with scientific progress or reduce
clinical access, and the contrasting opportunities for public opposition
between the American and European patent systems (BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes). The efforts of women’s health advocates to intervene where patentrelated obstacles complicate patient access to therapeutic compounds can
be observed at many of these junctures.
The women’s health movement of the last several decades has
focused attention on the health care needs of women, particularly with
respect to gender-specific diseases, such as breast cancer. Increased
biomedical research into women’s health, a desirable outcome of such
activism, may be accompanied by patent-related issues that paradoxically
frustrate access to medical breakthroughs. A comprehensive effort to
ensure women’s access to health resources must incorporate an analysis of
patent incentives for research and development as well as patent-related
barriers to medical treatment in order to guarantee gender parity in health
care.
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INTRODUCTION
Effective health care for women relies on a nexus of scientific, medical,
and legal regimes. Intellectual property law offers incentives for creative
accomplishments, and patent law, in particular, offers incentives for the
development of medical innovations. This Article will examine an
intersection of patent law with women’s health issues. Breast cancer is a
leading cause of mortality for women in the United States. In 2005, the
American Cancer Society estimated that 212,920 women would be
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diagnosed with breast cancer and 40,970 women will die of the disease.1 In
the last decade or so, there has been increased attention to this disease by
women’s health activists. This focus can be traced to the medical toll that
the disease has taken on the lives of women, but the phenomenon also
represents a maturing of the women’s health movement in the last several
decades that has galvanized public interest in women’s health, particularly
with respect to often neglected gender-specific diseases.2 In general, the
modern biomedical climate is shaped by significant advocacy from patients
organized into disease-specific constituencies, which aim to increase
private and public research funding through sustained lobbying efforts.3
In its most basic sense, cancer is a cellular disease in which normal cell
replication accelerates, resulting in tumor formation.4 Cancers are initially
classified by their site of appearance, such as lung, breast, or colon. While
cancer cells in general share common biochemical characteristics, each
specific type of cancer has individualized properties and requires focused
attention. Thus, much of cancer research is organized into studies that
concentrate on a particular cancer, and funding sources often specify a
cancer of interest in the allotment of resources.5 Progress in medical
research is often accompanied by the patenting of specific advances,
whether new drugs or treatment methods, and the breast cancer field is no
exception.
The government grant of a patent confers specific rights upon the holder
to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention.6
1. American Cancer Society Statistics, http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/breast.html
(last visited Nov. 30, 2006).
2. Dr. Bernadine Healy, as Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), created
the Office of Research on Women's Health in 1990 and established the Women’s Health
Initiative to ensure gender equity in the research on and treatment of women's health issues.
See Londa Schiebinger, HAS FEMINISM CHANGED SCIENCE? 123 (1999) (giving a thorough
treatment of the integration of women’s health issues into American medicine). The Food
and Drug Administration created an Office of Women's Health to specifically monitor
gender equity in pharmaceutical research. See Londa Schiebinger, Women’s Health and
Clinical Trials, 112 J. CLIN. INVEST. 973 (2003) (describing historic underrepresentation of
women from clinical trials of new pharmaceuticals).
3. Breast cancer advocacy, evidenced by the emergence of specific organizations such
as the National Breast Cancer Coalition, Breast Cancer Action, Susan G. Komen for the
Cure, and Y-Me, is an example of disease-centered patient advocacy. For a history of breast
cancer patient activism (and referencing the earlier models provided by AIDS activists), see
MAUREEN HOGAN CASAMAYOU, THE POLITICS OF BREAST CANCER (2001).
4. See BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., THE MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 1313-61 (2002)
(describing the molecular basis of cancer cell biology, and the opportunities for clinical
intervention based on a detailed biochemical comparison between normal and cancer cells).
5. See National Cancer Institute, Cancer Research Portfolio, http://research
portfolio.cancer.gov (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (organizing federal cancer research by
specific cancers, and listing 2,128 funded breast cancer research projects directed to
treatment, prevention, detection, survivorship, etiology, biology, and scientific model
systems).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006). The grant consists of "the right to exclude others from
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Patentability turns on the satisfaction of criteria that can be conceptually
divided into two groups: those that apply to the invention and those that
concern the sufficiency of the patent application itself. The invention itself
must satisfy the requirements for patentable subject matter,7 utility,8
novelty,9 and nonobviousness.10 The written patent document (the
specification) must meet separate legal requirements for the adequacy of
the disclosure itself.11 The patent examination process conducted by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) is intended to result in
the grant of patents that have met all of these requirements, and, as a result,
an issued patent enjoys a presumption of validity.12 Nonetheless, these
statutory grounds for patentability can resurface in patent litigation. An
accused infringer can later allege that an issued patent is invalid for failure
to satisfy one of these statutory criteria. The patent holder faces the
possibility of a judgment of patent invalidity in litigation, illustrating the
potential vulnerability of a patent asserted against accused infringers.13
The pharmaceutical industry, which often mediates the transfer of basic
scientific research into commercial drug products, has relied extensively on
patents and the resulting market exclusivity that can be achieved during the
patent term. In this sense, patent protection offers an incentive to
undertake scientific research. The industry expects that significant
financial returns from the marketplace will fund the research and
development (R&D) of new drugs and finance the clinical trials that are
necessary in order to win the approval of the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) for marketing.14 Industry claims about the high cost
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right
to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or
importing into the United States, products made by that process." Id. A patent term is
twenty years from the date of the filing of the patent application. Id. The origin of the U.S.
patent system can be traced to the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, authorizing
Congress to develop a system “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
7. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). A patent may be granted for a process, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter. A drug compound is a composition of matter.
8. Id. The invention must be useful, as defined by the inventor.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). A patent is barred by any public disclosure of identical
subject matter.
10. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). An invention may not be patented if its subject matter
would be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1st paragraph (2006). The patent document is required to have
certain attributes, including enablement, written description, and best mode, so that the
invention is fully disclosed.
12. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
13. Because a patent issued by the PTO is considered valid, the evidentiary standard for
a defendant to prove invalidity is clear and convincing evidence.
14. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Shifting Balance of Patents and Drug Regulation, 20
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of drug development have been criticized, with some critics claiming that a
disproportionate amount of revenue is directed to the marketing and
promotion of drugs, rather than to research.15 Pharmaceutical patents are a
type of chemical patent, and patents may be separately obtained for various
aspects of the underlying invention: drug compound, method of use,
formulation, and synthetic process. Drug substance patents cover the
active ingredient in the pharmaceutical product, while a method of use
patent can cover the use of the product to treat a specific condition.16 The
potential for a pharmaceutical company to hold multiple patents related to a
particular drug product can ensure a dominant position in the market.
The Article will survey intellectual property issues that have arisen in the
breast cancer field, specifically focusing on patent conflicts over specific
molecules with medical significance for the prevention, diagnosis, and
treatment of breast cancer: Taxol, Tamoxifen, Herceptin, and the BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes. This disease-centered analysis of patent issues is also
broad: the breast cancer patent climate illuminates many of the types of
patenting disputes that are paradigmatic in modern pharmaceutical science.
The case study of Taxol in Part II has implications for effective
government stewardship of its biomedical enterprise. The unavailability of
patent protection for an anticancer compound has not precluded intense
conflicts over other kinds of intellectual property claims and proprietary
disputes, as discussed in Part II with respect to Taxol. The recurring
conflicts between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies over
the rights to market and sell high profile treatments emerge in this
narrative, with accompanying antitrust concerns, as illustrated in Part II and
Part III with respect to Taxol and Tamoxifen. As breast cancer research
moved into the age of molecular biology, more recent controversies over
the patenting of biotechnology products appear. The patenting disputes
over Herceptin, a monoclonal antibody, and the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes
illustrate these dilemmas. Herceptin demonstrates the need for the
development of a generic approval process for medicines derived from
biotechnology, and the BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents raise questions
regarding the management of patents to genomic inventions. Significant
HEALTH AFFAIRS 119, 120 (2001).
15. The most widely industry-cited estimate is that a new drug costs about $800 million
to bring to market. This figure emerges from the largely industry-funded Tufts Center for
the Study of Drug Development study. See Joseph A. DiMasi et. al., The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003).
But see MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES 41-49 (2004) (giving a
critical analysis of the validity of DiMasi’s study, noting in particular that the study used
figures provided by the pharmaceutical companies that could not be independently verified
and only accounted for the most expensive drugs). Dr. Angell is the former editor in chief
of the NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE. Id.
16. See JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT LAW 38-39, 44-49 (2005).
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differences between the United States and Europe in the availability of
patent opposition procedures are illustrated by the legal challenges posed to
the European patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. Finally, breast
cancer activism by organizations exclusively devoted to education,
advocacy, and support for the disease has included efforts to address
patent-mediated obstacles to the availability of medical treatments. As the
Article will demonstrate, the conflicts over pharmaceutical access can
involve three separate areas of the law: patent, food and drug, and antitrust
law.
The molecules that are the focus of the Article follow from the evolution
of modern cancer research: the science of oncology has progressed from
employing undifferentiated attacks on tumors to designing precise
molecular treatments based on detailed structural knowledge of the cancer
cell in specific cancers.17 The traditional modalities of surgery, radiation,
and chemotherapy have been supplemented or replaced with targeted
approaches identified through molecular biology.18 The Article analyzes
the patent issues with respect to Taxol, Tamoxifen, Herceptin, and the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, critical compounds for the prevention,
diagnosis, and treatment of breast cancer, considering the role of patents as
incentives for research and the role of patents in mediating patient access to
these medical advances.
II. TAXOL
Cancer cells exhibit a characteristic disorder—they do not observe the
routine cell cycle that regulates when cells divide. Their growth is
unchecked and off-cycle; the processes of cell replication accelerate,
resulting in tumor formation. In order to divide so rapidly, the cancer cell
must organize its cellular machinery to facilitate rapid cell division. This
fact can be exploited by researchers—any disruption of the required
cellular machinery will interfere with the unchecked growth of these cells.
There is a lengthy history of federal investment in cancer research and
pharmaceutical development. The National Cancer Institute (NCI) is an
institute within the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and was established

17. See SUSAN M. LOVE, M.D. & KAREN LINDSEY, DR. SUSAN LOVE’S BREAST BOOK
244 (2005) (“[W]e have seen the approach to treating breast cancer shift from surgery center
stage and radiation and chemotherapy playing supporting roles, to chemotherapy and
hormone therapy as the leads while surgery and radiation have moved into ancillary
positions.”).
18. A phrase from Dr. Susan Love summarizing traditional approaches to cancer
treatment as "slash, burn, and poison" has been quoted often in the medical literature. See
ROBERT BAZELL, HER 2: THE MAKING OF HERCEPTIN, A REVOLUTIONARY TREATMENT FOR
BREAST CANCER 25 (1998).
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in 1937 with the passage of the National Cancer Act.19 The NCI
established the Natural Products Program in 1958 to screen 35,000 plant
species for compounds that might exhibit anticancer activity.20 An extract
from the bark of the Pacific yew tree showed antitumor activity. One such
compound from the plant was isolated in 1971 and was given the name
Taxol.21 The mechanism by which Taxol could arrest the proliferation of
cancer cells was elucidated by Susan Horwitz and her colleagues, who
discovered that the compound prevented the formation of microtubules,
disrupting the cellular apparatus required for cell division.22 This
mechanism is a general one—meaning that many different types of cancer
cells might be receptive to this interruption.23 In practice, however, such
agents will usually demonstrate particular efficacy against specific cancers
that cannot be predicted in advance.
The NCI filed an Investigational New Drug Application (IND) with the
FDA to begin clinical trials of Taxol in 1983.24 Phase II trials began in
1985.25 NCI, as a federal research institute, however, could not undertake
the development of the compound as a pharmaceutical.
It is important to note that Taxol was not a patentable compound. At the
time that its clinical potential was recognized for the treatment of cancer,
the compound had been known in the scientific community for many years
and had been characterized in the scientific literature. As a result, the
compound could not meet the novelty requirement of U.S. patent law and
was in the public domain.26 Other forms of patent protection remained
available, however, such as patents on the process of making or using the
compound or patents to specific pharmaceutical formulations of the
compound. Patents of methods using a compound in specific clinical
applications may have commercial potential.27

19. CASAMAYOU, supra note 3, at 27-29 (describing the origin of efforts to involve the
federal government in cancer research, which led to the establishment of the National
Cancer Institute).
20. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-829, TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: NIH-PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TAXOL 8-9, 2003
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
21. Id. at 4 (noting that Taxol is also the trademarked brand name chosen by BristolMyers Squibb, while the generic name is paclitaxel).
22. Peter B. Schiff and Susan Band Horwitz, Taxol Stabilizes Microtubules in Mouse
Fibroblast Cells, 77 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 1561 (1980).
23. ALBERTS ET AL, supra note 4, at 928.
24. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 9.
25. Id. at 9.
26. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 32.
27. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: American
Dilemma: The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 717, 724 (2005)
(noting, however, the difficulties in the enforcement of therapeutic method claims).
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In the 1970s, Congress had recognized that the results of federally
funded research often did not get transferred for commercial development
in the absence of explicit mechanisms to involve the private sector.28
Legislative action began with the enactment of the Stevenson-Wydler Act
in 1980, which authorized federal agencies to “transfer federally owned or
originated technology to State and local governments and to the private
sector.”29 This original imperative was strengthened with the enactment of
the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986.30 These statutes authorize
government laboratories to enter into cooperative research and
development agreements (CRADAs) with industrial partners in order to
facilitate technology transfer from government to the private sector.31
These efforts begin with the publication of a notice in the Federal Register
that announces the CRADA opportunity.32
In 1989, NIH published a CRADA notice seeking an industrial partner to
develop Taxol for entry into the market.33 Four applications were received,
and the NIH chose Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) as its CRADA partner.34
The signing of this agreement led to an exchange whereby NCI would
provide its clinical trial data to BMS for use in its New Drug Application
(NDA) to the FDA, while BMS would supply NCI with quantities of Taxol
for use in its studies.35 In 1992, BMS received FDA approval for the use of
Taxol in the treatment of refractory ovarian cancer, and in 1994, it received
approval for Taxol use in the treatment of advanced breast cancer.36
The absence of patent protection for the Taxol compound did not
foreclose other means by which BMS could maintain exclusive control of
the Taxol market. The CRADA agreement gave BMS the exclusive use of

28. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents
and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996)
(describing the history of the efforts to recruit the private sector to the project of
commercializing inventions resulting from federally funded research).
29. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, § 11, 94 Stat. 2311, 2318
(1980)(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (a), (b) (2006)). The other significant
mechanism for federal technology transfer was also created in 1980 by the Bayh-Dole Act,
which allowed government grantees, such as universities, to retain title to their inventions
and engage in their own efforts to commercialize such technologies. Pub. L. No. 96-517 §
6, 94 Stat. 3019 (1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2006)).
30. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(1986) (codified as amended at 15 § U.S.C. 3710(e) (2006)).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Opportunity for a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA)
for the Scientific and Commercial Development of Taxol as an Anticancer Agent, 54 Fed.
Reg. 31,733 (1989).
34. GAO Report, supra note 20, at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id.

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol15/iss2/9

8

Kane: Symposium: Molecules and Conflict: Cancer, Petents, and Women's H

2007]

MOLECULES AND CONFLICT

313

the clinical data gathered by NCI, and thus BMS was the only
pharmaceutical company that was able to secure an FDA approval for
Taxol. BMS was granted five years of market exclusivity by the FDA
because Taxol was a new chemical entity (NCE) not previously approved
by the FDA, a status that automatically triggers the award of such
exclusivity by statute.37
The anticipated end to BMS’s market exclusivity in 1997 did not occur
due to the company’s activities in building a Taxol-related patent portfolio.
As previously discussed, a patent may be filed on a particular method of
making or using the compound, known as a method patent.38 BMS filed
for its own patents on various methods to use Taxol in cancer treatment,
and two patents were issued.39 Because Taxol itself was not under patent,
the therapeutic market was of immense interest to generic pharmaceutical
companies who were interested in bringing low-cost alternatives to
market.40 All possible generic entrants were required to observe any
existing patents that might pertain to their proposed products, and this is
where the BMS patent strategy showed force.
Some background information is required. By the 1980s, Congress
recognized the need to incentivize the generic pharmaceutical industry, so
that lower-cost alternatives to brand-name pharmaceuticals could be
developed. In an effort to encourage the development of generic
pharmaceuticals as alternatives to brand-name products, the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the “HatchWaxman Act”) was enacted with objectives that addressed the concerns of
both brand-name and generic pharmaceutical companies.41 The statute
accomplished several objectives. Brand-name pharmaceutical companies
were offered patent term restoration when effective pharmaceutical patent
terms had been eroded by clinical testing and FDA approval.42 A generic
pharmaceutical company could rely on the safety and efficacy data
provided by the brand-name pharmaceutical company when it sought FDA
37. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (c)(3)(D)(ii), (iii) (2006).
38. See Eisenberg, supra note 27.
39. See U.S. Patent Nos. 5,641,803 (filed Oct. 18, 1995) (issued June 24, 1997) and
5,670,537 (filed Sept. 19, 1996) (issued Sept. 23, 1997) [hereinafter 1997 Patents].
40. A generic pharmaceutical is one with the same active ingredient as a brand-name
pharmaceutical compound. A brand-name pharmaceutical has received first approval by the
FDA for that active ingredient, and the public often associates the brand name with the
active ingredient. The brand-name product commands dominant market position by virtue of
its initial exclusivity. Patient loyalty may persist even after generic alternatives exist.
41. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 98 Stat.
1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006), 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006), and 35 U.S.C. §
271 (e) (2006)) (amending 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(2)(C) (2006)); see also THOMAS, supra note
16, at 12-19.
42. See 35 U.S.C. § 156.
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approval for the original compound, as long as the generic compound was
bioequivalent to the approved drug. The generic pharmaceutical
manufacturer could then enter the market by filing an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA) declaring its proposed generic compound to be
bioequivalent to the existing approved product.43 However, the generic
pharmaceutical manufacturer is required to observe any existing patents
covering the original product. This information can be obtained because
the original filer of a New Drug Application (NDA) is required to inform
the FDA of all patents that cover the pharmaceutical in question, and they
are listed in an agency publication entitled “Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence,” commonly known as the “Orange Book.”44 In
order to enter a market controlled by existing patents, a company seeking to
develop a generic pharmaceutical is required to make one of four possible
certifications and account for the relationship of its proposed
pharmaceutical to the patents that are listed in the Orange Book.45 The
Hatch-Waxman Act also immunized generic pharmaceutical manufacturers
from infringement claims based on activities undertaken to prepare for the
filing of an ANDA.46 The statute created specific procedures for the
generic pharmaceutical applicant to challenge the validity of an existing
pharmaceutical patent or for a patent holder to allege infringement in
situations where an ANDA was filed with a Paragraph IV certification.
The patent holder was granted an automatic 30-month stay upon the filing
of an infringement suit against the ANDA filer in order for the
infringement claim to be adjudicated.47 The incentive for a generic
pharmaceutical manufacturer to challenge an existing, possibly invalid
patent was created by the award of a 180-day period of market exclusivity
to the first generic applicant to file a patent challenge to an approved
pharmaceutical.48
The strategies used by BMS to maintain market monopoly following the
expiration of its FDA-granted monopoly in 1997 relied on the questionable
use of these Hatch-Waxman procedures, ultimately resulting in the filing of
a Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Complaint alleging unlawful acts by

43. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv).
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A).
45. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A)(i-iv). The generic applicant must certify that a patent
pertaining to the proposed generic compound is (i) not filed; (ii) expired; (iii) the date on
which such a patent will expire; or (iv) that such a patent is invalid or will not be infringed
by the manufacture, use or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted. Id.
These certifications are generally denoted by their number in common parlance, such as a
Paragraph IV certification.
46. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1).
47. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(B)(iv).
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BMS, which delayed generic competition in the Taxol market.49 By 1997,
BMS had two patents that could pose a barrier to generic entry into the
Taxol market.50 IVAX was the first company to file an ANDA. A patent
infringement suit by BMS against IVAX triggered the statutory 30-month
stay allowed by Hatch-Waxman. When litigation ensued, both BMS
patents were found invalid, a decision upheld by the Federal Circuit.51 In
its complaint, the FTC alleged that BMS obtained the method patents
through inequitable conduct before the PTO and that BMS improperly
listed the patents in the Orange Book.52 Although the patents were held
invalid by 2001, the baseless litigation had succeeded in extending the
BMS market monopoly.
The FTC further charged that BMS had licensed a third patent from
American Biosciences, Inc. (ABI) and improperly listed the patent in the
Orange Book in order to block or delay further attempts by generic
competitors to enter the Taxol market.53 This patent triggered a series of
lawsuits that attempted to clarify the mechanisms for Orange Book listing,
including whether a private right of action seeking an Orange Book listing
is permissible under Hatch-Waxman.54 The National Organization of
Women (NOW) demanded that BMS halt its legal “manipulation of the
judicial and regulatory systems in order to maintain its monopoly
pricing.”55 In response to the extensive uncertainty regarding the propriety
of the Orange Book listing of this patent, the FDA did not require other
generic ANDA applicants to certify to the patent, effectively removing this
last patent as an obstacle to generic competitors.56 As a result, the first
49. See Complaint, In re Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. C-4076 (F.T.C. Apr. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyerscmp.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Complaint] (alleging anticompetitive conduct with respect to the drugs BuSpar, Taxol, and
Platinol).
50. See 1997 Patents, supra note 39.
51. Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Ben Venue Labs, Inc., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
52. FTC Complaint, supra note 49, at 7-18. Inequitable conduct refers to conduct by
the patent applicant during patent prosecution in which material information is withheld
from or misrepresented to the PTO in order to obtain a patent. See THOMAS, supra note 16,
at 268-273.
53. Id. at 18-20 (citing U.S. Patent No. 6,096,331 as a separate source of
anticompetitive competition).
54. See American Biosciences, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. CB 00-08577WMD AJWX, 2000 WL 1278348 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (noting BMS sought to voluntarily list
the patent in the Orange Book after a court initially listed the patent by court order, which
allowed ABI to sue IVAX for patent infringement, further delaying generic entry).
Ultimately, the court decided that there was no private right of action to force the listing of a
patent. Id.
55. Press Release, National Organization for Women, Feminists Demand Affordable
Anti-Cancer Drug, Take on Pharmaceutical Manufacturer (Dec. 3, 2001),
http://www.now.org/press/12-01/12-03-01.html (reporting monopoly pricing “as high as
$20,000 per patient per year,” partly due to loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act).
56. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
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approval of generic Taxol to IVAX occurred in September 2000.57 The
FTC reached a settlement with BMS, with BMS agreeing not to enforce or
collect royalties on any new “Taxol Patent” that could possibly cover the
existing FDA-approved product, to refrain from any sham litigation to
injure a generic competitor, and to avoid any improper Orange Book
listings which would delay generic competition.58 A separate class action
suit against BMS on behalf of consumers filed by State Attorneys General,
alleging fraudulent procurement of patents to delay generic competition,
was settled in 2004, and a fund was established to provide payment to
patients who effectively overpaid for Taxol.59
The extensive litigation and Hatch-Waxman disputes over Taxol
illustrate the potential for a brand-name manufacturer to manipulate
complicated regulatory processes in order to maintain control of a lucrative
pharmaceutical market. The conduct of BMS with respect to Taxol and
other products was at least partly responsible for eliciting FTC attention
and investigation into a wider pattern of anticompetitive conduct by brandname drug companies to delay the development of competitive generic
pharmaceuticals.60 Subsequent amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act,
responding to perceived loopholes in the original enactment, now limit a
pharmaceutical company to one 30-month stay of approval per ANDA
application, limit the types of patents that may be listed in the Orange
Book, allow for a generic company counterclaim requesting delisting of a
patent in the Orange Book, and award the 180-day market exclusivity to a
generic company only upon commercial marketing of a product. 61
The phenomenal market success of Taxol drew attention to the proper
management of technology transfer from the federal government to private
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY A-37, July 2002 [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
57. Id.
58. See Federal Trade Commission Consent Order Analysis, In re Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyersanalysis.htm (last visited Nov. 30, 2006)
(noting that BMS “abused governmental processes to delay generic competition” for several
of its brand-name drugs, including Taxol).
59. Press Release, Office of the Attorney General (April 24, 2003), http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/apr/apr24b_03.html. (noting that the antitrust action was
filed by all 50 states and resulted in a compensation fund established to reimburse patients
who overpaid for Taxol between 1999 and 2003).
60. See FTC Report, supra note 56, at 1 (“The study was designed to determine
whether…particular provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments are susceptible to
strategies to delay or deter consumer access to low-cost generic alternatives to brand-name
products.”). The report recommended that only one automatic 30-month stay of approval
per drug product per ANDA be allowed. Id. at ii.
61. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2), (j)(5), (b)(3), (c)(3) (2006); see also Barbara J. Williams,
A Prescription for Anxiety: An Analysis of Three Brand-Name Drug Companies and
Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40 NEW ENGL. L. REV. 1 (2005) (analyzing the tactics
of several brand-name companies to delay generic entry and suggesting further adjustments
to Hatch-Waxman).
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industry, particularly with respect to adequate compensation from the
private sector to the government.62 Senator Ron Wyden requested that the
General Accounting Office (GAO) investigate whether NIH had properly
negotiated its CRADA with BMS, particularly with respect to revenues
paid by BMS to NIH in exchange for data exclusivity.63 Noting that BMS
had worldwide sales of $9,000,000,000 from 1993 until 2002 and that NIH
only received $35,000,000 in royalties during that period, the GAO report
found that “NIH made substantial investments in research related to Taxol,
but its financial benefits from the collaboration with BMS have not been
great in comparison to BMS’s revenue from the drug.”64 With respect to
any government influence on the drug price charged by BMS, the report
noted that the original CRADA referred to “NIH’s concern that Taxol be
fairly priced given the public investment in Taxol, but it did not require that
reasonable evidence be presented to show that this would occur.”65 A
“reasonable pricing” clause was incorporated into federal CRADA
agreements until 1995, at which time it was dropped.66
The development of Taxol illustrates an asymmetry between public
investment and private benefit in some sectors of medical research, and the
potential for government leverage over products in the pharmaceutical
market by strategic transfer agreements that ensure public access to the
products of federally-funded research.67 However, government authorities
62. See GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 1 (noting that “by 2001, [Taxol] had become
the best selling drug in cancer history”).
63. Id. at 2.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 4 (noting that “[t]he federal government has been a major payer for Taxol,
primarily through Medicare,” where such payments totaled nearly $700 million over the
five-year period prior to approval of the generic version of the drug). Senator Wyden stated
that “NIH didn’t use its authority to require an accounting from the drug company that
Taxol would be reasonably priced.” Senator Ron Wyden, Prepared Statement for Taxol
News
Conference,
(June
6,
2003),
http://
wyden.senate.gov/media/speeches/2003/06062003_taxol_statement.html.
66. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8. If an agency is not willing to monitor for
reasonable pricing, a ready alternative is to design a royalty structure that more fairly
recognizes the economic significance of the federally funded research and repays the
taxpayers in aggregate.
See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches
Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics
Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 197-98 (2001) (noting the advantage of using a percentage of
profits calculation to achieve a return to the government, and using that revenue for drug
access, in contrast to a drug pricing regime). Much of the criticism of NIH might have been
obviated had the agency initially negotiated for a more significant revenue return.
67. Scholars have noted the availability of government leverage and criticized the
unwillingness of government agencies to assert their statutory authority in order to facilitate
public access to federally funded research tools and pharmaceutical products. See Peter S.
Arno and Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We Enforce Existing Price Controls? The
Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed Upon Patents
Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 (2001)
(analyzing the march-in rights afforded to the federal government by the Bayh-Dole Act and
their underuse); see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the
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must affirmatively decide to incorporate considerations of public benefit
when they engage in negotiations to transfer federally-funded technologies.
Alternatively, the government possesses the right to grant a compulsory
license to a patent when circumstances would warrant, but it has generally
declined to use this authority to facilitate access to medicines.68 A
lingering concern from the Taxol narrative, therefore, is the unresolved
dilemma of fully leveraging the use of taxpayer-funded biomedical
research to ensure access equity to the pharmaceutical products emerging
from such research.
The Taxol history further illustrates the potential for unfair market
dominance that can arise from manipulation of the regulatory processes
that govern the patent interface between brand-name and generic drug
manufacturers, and this phenomenon will be further discussed in Part III,
infra, with respect to Tamoxifen. Recent reforms to the Hatch-Waxman
process have eliminated some of the opportunities for brand-name
pharmaceutical companies to block or delay generic competition.69
However, patients may continue to access consumer relief in the form of
private, state, or FTC antitrust enforcement actions when pharmaceutical
market competition is delayed by illegal means, and this is where women’s
health advocates can maintain vigilance.
III. TAMOXIFEN
Breast cancer has a distinct relationship to the endocrine system—the
group of hormones that are central to the maintenance of life. As the
disease predominantly occurs in women, breast cancer cells have long been
considered to be receptive to the presence or absence of female hormones,
particularly estrogen.70
Tamoxifen is a synthetic nonsteroidal compound that was developed in
Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 310-11 (2003) (arguing for
increased involvement by federal research granting agencies in order to ensure access to
publicly funded research); Amy R. Schofield, The Demise of Bayh-Dole Protections Against
the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Abuses of Government-Funded Inventions, 32 J. L. MED. &
ETHICS 777 (2004) (describing the unsuccessful march-in petition filed by patient advocates
with NIH, seeking intervention with respect to the 400% increase in the price of the AIDS
drug Norvir, manufactured by Abbott). But see NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, A PLAN
TO ENSURE THAT TAXPAYER’S INTERESTS ARE PROTECTED 16 (2001) (asserting that a
reasonable pricing clause in CRADA agreements was a disincentive to the private sector,
that Bayh-Dole mediated technology transfer could not easily accommodate a revenue
stream back to the government, and that the public benefits in the aggregate through the
biomedical research facilitated by modern technology transfer policies).
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2006) (giving the federal government the right to use and
manufacture any patented invention, whether or not it is developed with federal funding,
and to authorize third parties to do so as well, subject to the payment of compensation to the
patent holder).
69. See THOMAS, supra note 16, at 23-25.
70. LOVE & LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 152.
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the 1970s and shown to have antiestrogenic activity, meaning that it could
bind to and block the cellular receptors for estrogen.71 Earlier clinical
observations had shown that removal of the ovaries, where estrogen is
produced, in women with breast cancer could cause remission of the
cancer.72 These findings indicated that some breast cancer cells were
dependent on estrogen for their maintenance, a fact that suggested a
potential vulnerability of these cells. Later research established that some
breast cancer cells have estrogen receptors (ER).73 These are called ERpositive cells. Tumor cells from breast cancer patients are now routinely
characterized for their ER status, and the presence of estrogen receptors on
tumor cells creates therapeutic possibilities with more favorable prognostic
implications.74
Tamoxifen, therefore, as a compound with antiestrogenic activity,
emerged as a promising hormonal treatment to block the estrogen
stimulation of ER-positive tumor cells and decrease cell replication.
Clinical studies that began in the 1970s revealed that Tamoxifen was
effective in the treatment of advanced breast cancer, with reduced side
effects in comparison to other hormonal alternatives.75 Tamoxifen received
FDA approval for the treatment of postmenopausal women with metastatic
breast cancer in 1977.76 As Tamoxifen came into widespread use, clinical
observations suggested that the compound not only reduced existing
tumors, but also reduced any recurrences of cancer in an unaffected breast;
as a result, Tamoxifen was proposed as a chemopreventive agent for
women at high risk of breast cancer. The Breast Cancer Prevention Trial
administered Tamoxifen to healthy women over the age of sixty who were
at high risk for breast cancer, and the results demonstrated a significant
reduction in the expected number of cancers.77
The study was
controversial, however, as it required healthy women to take potentially
dangerous hormonal supplements, and the National Women’s Health
Network (NWHN) led the opposition, with a particular focus on the
possibility of Tamoxifen increasing the risk of uterine cancer.78 In actual
71. MICHAEL W. DEGREGORIO & VALERIE J. WIEBE, TAMOXIFEN AND BREAST CANCER
29 (1999); see also LOVE & LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 194 (noting that Tamoxifen belongs
to a class of drugs known as selective estrogen receptor modulators (SERM), which are
compounds that have both estrogenic and anti-estrogenic effects).
72. DEGREGORIO & WIEBE, supra note 71.
73. Id. at 30.
74. LOVE & LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 276-77.
75. J. Ingle et al., Randomized Clinical Trial of Diethylstilbestrol versus Tamoxifen in
Postmenopausal Women with Advanced Breast Cancer, 304 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 16 (1981).
76. DEGREGORIO & WIEBE, supra note 71, at 35.
77. Id. at 83.
78. BARRON H. LERNER, M.D., THE BREAST CANCER WARS 264 (2001).
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fact, the clinical trial did reveal some increased risk of uterine cancer in
patients, but supporters argued that the benefit from the reduction in breast
cancer outweighed this risk.79 In 1998, as a result of the chemoprevention
trial, the FDA approved Tamoxifen as a preventive agent for women over
age sixty at high risk for breast cancer.80
Imperial Chemical Industries, PLC (ICI) obtained U.S. Patent 4,536,516
on the compound Tamoxifen in 1985. The drug was sold under the trade
name, Nolvadex. The Hatch-Waxman Act had just been enacted in 1984,
and the possibility of generic competition in this drug market was more
likely as a result.81 Barr Laboratories, Inc., a generic drug manufacturer,
filed an ANDA for approval of generic Tamoxifen with the FDA in
December 1985, later amended in 1987 to contain a Paragraph IV
certification that the ICI patent was invalid and unenforceable.82
As allowed by Hatch-Waxman, ICI filed a patent infringement suit
against Barr upon learning of Barr’s intention to produce a generic
Tamoxifen. The lawsuit resulted in a judgment that the ICI Tamoxifen
patent was indeed invalid and unenforceable based on the fact that ICI
withheld relevant information from the PTO when obtaining its patent.83
ICI filed an appeal with the Federal Circuit.84 In theory, a judgment that
the Tamoxifen patent was invalid would remove any obstacle to a generic
manufacturer wishing to enter this lucrative market. While the appeal was
pending, however, ICI and Barr negotiated a settlement agreement in which
Barr agreed to drop its challenge to the ICI patent.85 The Federal Circuit
agreed to vacate the invalidity judgment.86 The settlement further provided
that ICI would pay Barr $21,000,000, supply Barr with ICI-manufactured
Tamoxifen for sale, and that Barr would sell the drug under its own label at
a price only 5 percent less than the brand-name drug price.87 This generic
drug price sharply departs from the expected price reductions that occur
79. Id. at 268.
80. DEGREGORIO & WIEBE, supra note 71, at 85.
81. See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying discussion.
82. See Imperial Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., 795 F. Supp. 619, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
83. Id.
84. Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC, v. Heumann Pharma GMBH & Co., No. 92-1403,
1993 WL 118931, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 19, 1993). The Federal Circuit has been the
exclusive federal appellate patent court since its creation in 1982.
85. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
86. Imperial Chem.,1993 WL 118931 at *1 (granting joint motion to vacate judgment).
87. See Andrew A. Caffrey, III & Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents
and Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman
Act, 9 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1, 68 (2004) (discussing terms of the settlement agreement and
noting that the five percent price difference sharply deviates from the traditional thirty to
eighty percent price difference between generic and brand-name drugs).
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when a generic enters the market and is an example of what has been called
“pseudo-generics.”88 This practice has been criticized as a collusive
arrangement that facilitates joint market dominance by the brand-name
company and its authorized generic licensee, depriving consumers of a
truly competitive generic product.89
Astra Zeneca (Zeneca) acquired ICI and its patents. Following the
attempted generic entry by Barr, several other generic competitors
attempted to enter the Tamoxifen market in the 1990s but were successfully
sued by Zeneca for patent infringement of the same 1985 patent, in cases
that were unaffected by the contrary finding of patent invalidity in the
earlier Barr lawsuit.90 As the first generic filer, Barr, despite the settlement
with Zeneca, retained the option for the 180-day exclusivity entitlement
allowed by Hatch-Waxman and could effectively stall any true generic
competition.91
The settlement payment from a brand-name company to a generic
competitor that terminates a patent infringement suit is often called a
“reverse payment,” as the payment flows from plaintiff to defendant.
Although settlements of patent disputes are generally favored, this
particular practice has invited criticism that collusion between a dominant
brand name and the rival generic allows both to control the market to the
detriment of patient consumers and third-party payers.92 The practice also
frustrates the role of patent litigation in eliminating weak patents that pose
an unnecessary barrier to market competition. As a result, the practice has
invited the scrutiny of the FTC because of the antitrust implications and
potential for consumer harm.93 Clearly, the absence of a competitive

88. See Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of Pharmaceutical Patents 39, in 4 INNOVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2004) (defining “pseudo-generics” as
a “branded drug sold as a generic under license from the brand”). The phenomenon is also
known by the term “authorized generics.”
89. See id. at 39-40.
90. See Zeneca, Ltd. v. Novopharm Ltd., 111 F.3d 144 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Zeneca Ltd. v.
Pharmachemie, B.V., 37 F.Supp.2d 85 (D. Mass 1999); Zeneca Ltd. v. Mylan Labs, 968
F.Supp. 268 (W.D. Pa. 1997), rev’d, 173 F.3d 829 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
91. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(B)(iv) (2006). As one of the recent changes to the HatchWaxman Act, this 180-day period of exclusivity is now only available upon the first
commercial marketing of the generic product and may be forfeited by patent settlement
agreements between brand-name and generic competitors that raise antitrust issues. See
THOMAS, supra note 16, at 24-25.
92. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis, & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive
Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1759 (2003) (such
settlements are presumptively anti-competitive, absent certain showings by the infringement
plaintiff). The reverse payments are also called “exclusion payments.” Id. at 1749.
93. See FTC Report, supra note 56, at 25-37. Certain settlement agreements between
brand-name and generic pharmaceutical competitors are now required to be filed with the
Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice. See THOMAS, supra note 16, at
571-72.
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generic marketplace will keep drug prices high.
In 2001, a coalition of consumer groups filed class action lawsuits
against Zeneca and Barr, alleging that the 1993 reverse payment settlement
violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.94 The plaintiffs alleged that the
settlement allowed Zeneca and Barr to resuscitate a patent declared invalid,
control the entire U.S. Tamoxifen market, and exclude competition from
other generic manufacturers, effectively keeping drug prices high and
reducing patient access.95 The district court dismissed the complaint,
finding that the plaintiffs suffered no antitrust injury, noting that none of
the other generic competitors that might have entered the market had
succeeded in invalidating the Zeneca patent, an outcome that was not the
result of the settlement at issue.96 The verdict was affirmed by the Second
Circuit, which declared that reverse payment settlements were not per se
unlawful provided that the underlying litigation was not a sham and that the
settlement did not constitute an unlawful extension of a valid patent
monopoly.97 The Tamoxifen decision from the Second Circuit is in direct
contrast with the Sixth Circuit adoption of a per se illegality standard for
such settlements.98 In an enforcement action by the FTC against ScheringPlough, the Eleventh Circuit did not adopt a per se illegality rule but
endorsed an inquiry into the validity of the underlying patent.99 Although
the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari in Schering-Plough, there is now
significant disagreement among the appellate circuits regarding the
standard for reviewing these settlements, and the Tamoxifen case presents
an attractive opportunity for the Court to clarify the patent/antitrust
interface with respect to reverse payments in pharmaceutical patent
settlements.100 The phenomenon of a reverse payment that followed a
judgment of the invalidity of the Tamoxifen patent is particularly egregious
94. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (declaring any contract in restraint of trade
or commerce among the states to be illegal).
95. Tamoxifen Antitrust Litigation, 277 F.Supp.2d at 123 (noting that plaintiffs included
senior citizen groups, labor unions, and health care advocates); see also Press Release,
Prescription Access Group, Consumer Groups Charge Price Collusion on Key Breast
Cancer Drug (May 9, 2003), http://www.prescriptionaccess. org/index.php?doc_id=574
(quoting Kim Shellenberger, director of the Prescription Access Litigation Project: “These
companies have colluded to keep a life-saving drug priced beyond the reach of many breast
cancer patients”).
96. Tamoxifen Antitrust Litigation, 277 F.Supp.2d at 136.
97. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 429 F.3d 370, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
23653 (2d Cir. 2005), amended and superseded by 466 F.3d 187, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
22154 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2006). A petition for rehearing was denied in September 2006.
98. See In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
99. See Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2929; 165 L. Ed. 2d 977; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 5128 (June 26, 2006).
100. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tamoxifen Antitrust Litigation, 429 F.3d 370 (No.
06-830), available at http://www.orangebookblog.com/Tamoxifen_20Cert_20 Petition.pdf.
The petition for Supreme Court review was filed on Dec. 13, 2006.
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and warrants heightened scrutiny from the judiciary.
The lucrative Tamoxifen market generated significant maneuvering of
the available patent strategies for the market leader to maintain a dominant
position using Hatch-Waxman procedures, as was also observed with
respect to Taxol, supra Part II. The strategies succeeded in delaying
generic competition until the expiration of the Zeneca patent in 2002.101 It
is important to note that nearly a decade passed between the original
judgment that the Zeneca Tamoxifen patent was invalid and the
introduction of generic alternatives.
The Tamoxifen history and the methods by which Zeneca maintained its
market dominance have raised the visibility of two phenomena in the
pharmaceutical sector: pseudo-generics and reverse payments in patent
settlements. Legislation has been introduced to reduce the introduction of
pseudo-generics102 and to more effectively monitor anticompetitive
settlement agreements.103 It is possible that health consumers may continue
to encounter unfair competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace when
companies unfairly collude, and the breast cancer marketplace could
continue to be an attractive target for anticompetitive conduct. Patient
advocates, however, have also entered the debate with a vigorous litigation
strategy that reflects a sophisticated understanding of the patent/antitrust
interface. The FTC has increased its surveillance of patent settlements that
disadvantage patients and insurers.104 This vigilance by citizens and
regulatory authorities could reduce future opportunities for anticompetitive
behavior in the pharmaceutical sector.
IV. HERCEPTIN
The modern approach to cancer research is to comprehend the cancer
cell through a precise analysis of its molecular features, particularly its
genes and proteins. Cancer cells have unique surface features. When
certain molecules appear predominantly on cancer cells and not on normal
cells, they are assumed to have some importance in the growth of the
cancer cells and are often referred to as markers or antigens.105
101. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ELECTRONIC ORANGE BOOK (2006), http://
www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (noting that generic competition in the Tamoxifen market
is provided by Aegis, Andrx, Barr, Ivax, Mylan, Pharmachemie, Roxane, and Teva).
102. See S. 3695, 109th Congress (2006) (banning the sale of authorized generic drugs
during the first ANDA filer's 180 day exclusivity period).
103. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 3582, 109th Congress (2006)
(prohibiting brand-name drug companies from entering into "reverse payment" settlements
with generic drug companies).
104. See THOMAS, supra note 16, at 571-72 (noting that such settlements are now
required to be filed with the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice).
105. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 4, at 1358.
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Characterization of isolated breast cancer cells has revealed a number of
unique biochemical traits. In particular, about twenty to thirty-five percent
of breast cancer cells show a distinct overabundance of a specific protein
on their surface, known as Her-2.106 Dennis Slamon and coworkers
discovered that breast cancer cells with an overexpression of Her-2
signaled a particularly aggressive form of breast cancer. 107 In the late
1980s, these kinds of observations gave rise to the field of molecular
oncology, which is the application of molecular biology to cancer. The
early biotechnology companies were introducing novel therapeutic
compounds, such a recombinant proteins, which are produced by cellular
processes, rather than chemical synthesis.108 A promising response to the
observation of novel proteins on the surface of the cancer cell is to
neutralize them with an antibody, a specific protein that will recognize and
bind to the surface molecule. Because of its specificity, a monoclonal
antibody is the preferred therapeutic form for patient administration.109
Such antibodies are classified by the FDA as biologics.110 The FDA
regulates biologics (blood products, vaccines, proteins, antibodies, gene
therapy products) separately from other pharmaceuticals.111 These products
present novel challenges for regulation and approval. For monoclonal
antibodies to be approved as therapeutics, issues of product consistency and
manufacturing reliability have particular force.
106. S.A. Aronson, Amplification of a Novel v-erb-B-related Gene in a Human
Mammary Carcinoma, 229 SCIENCE 974 (1985). The gene is formally known as Her-2/neu,
acknowledging the research origins of the discovery and the molecular relationship of the
gene to the human epidermal growth factor receptor family. See BAZELL, supra note 18, at
33-34.
107. D.J. Slamon et al., Human Breast Cancer: Correlation of Relapse and Survival with
Amplification of the Her-2/neu Oncogene, 235 SCIENCE 177 (1987). Because the
overexpressed surface protein is involved in a biochemical pathway that stimulates cell
reproduction, an antibody to the protein can have an anticancer effect due to its interruption
of this signaling mechanism, thus inhibiting cell replication. See BAZELL, supra note 18, at
42.
108. See GARY ZWEIGER, TRANSDUCING THE GENOME: INFORMATION, ANARCHY, AND
REVOLUTION IN THE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES 161 (2001). The early biotechnology companies
began to form in the 1970s; Genentech was formed in 1976. Id.
109. See Georges Kohler & Cesar Milstein, Continuous Cultures of Fused Cells
Secreting Antibody of Predefined Specificity, 256 NATURE 495 (1975) (describing the
technique for producing monoclonal antibodies by a cell culture technique that assures
continuous clonal replication, guaranteeing product purity). This technique revolutionized
immunology, making it possible to obtain significant quantities of a purified antibody.
110. The terms “biopharmaceutical” or “biotechnology medicines” are also used to
describe therapeutic compounds produced by cellular processes, rather than industrial
laboratory manufacture. See GARY WALSH, BIOPHARMACEUTICALS: BIOCHEMISTRY AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY 2 (2003).
111. A manufacturer seeking approval of a biologic submits a Biologics License
Application (BLA) to the FDA. See id. at 80. Within the FDA, monoclonal antibody
applications are reviewed by the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER). See
FDA, Transfer of Therapeutic Biological Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, http://www.fda.gov/oc/combination/transfer.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2006).
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Genentech, a biotechnology company, recognized that the molecular
approach to cancer treatment was likely to yield promising therapeutic
compounds, but it was cautious with respect to the resources it devoted to
the nascent field.112 In response to the vigorous advocacy of breast cancer
patient advocates, however, Genentech sponsored clinical trials involving
the administration of a Her-2 antibody, known as trastuzumab, to patients
with advanced breast cancer. It was given the trade name Herceptin.113
Following the demonstration that the antibody reduced or eliminated
tumors in a significant number of patients, Genentech filed a Biologics
License Application (BLA) with the FDA in 1998 and was granted
approval for the use of Herceptin to treat patients with metastatic breast
cancer whose tumors overexpress the Her-2 protein.114 Herceptin has been
used in treatment since 1998 and has been described as the first clinically
approved drug to target a specific molecular target.115 It is an early
illustration of pharmacogenomics, the clinical convergence of genetics and
pharmacology, which attempts to identify the patients that will benefit from
certain therapeutics based on their genetic status.116 More recently, clinical
trials of Herceptin in combination with Taxol for the treatment of earlystage breast cancer have shown very promising results, and Genentech has
received FDA approval for this use of Herceptin.117
Genentech has obtained several patents that cover the antibodies and
methods for their production.118 The prominence of Herceptin in the
treatment of breast cancer has increased rapidly, with an accompanying
financial gain for Genentech.119 Chiron Corporation, another of the early
112. See BAZELL, supra note 18, at 45-47.
113. For a detailed treatment of the clinical development of the Her-2 monoclonal
antibody and the role of Genentech and breast cancer activists, see id. at 109-177.
114. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, PRODUCT
APPROVAL
INFORMATION—LICENSING
ACTION
(1998),
www.fda.gov/cder/foi/
appletter/1998/trasgen092598L.htm.
115. See Nickolas Papadopoulos et al., The Role of Companion Diagnostics in the
Development and Use of Mutation-Targeted Therapies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 985,
989 (2006).
116. See Kathryn A. Phillips, The Intersection Of Biotechnology And
Pharmacogenomics: Health Policy Implications, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS, 1271, 1274 (2006).
117. See Edward H. Romond et al., Trastuzumab Plus Adjuvant Chemotherapy for
Operable Her-2-Positive Breast Cancer, 353 NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE 1673
(2005). The FDA approval was granted in November 2006. Press Release, F.D.A. Expands
Use of Herceptin for Early Stage Breast Cancer After Primary Therapy (Dec. 12, 2006),
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2006/NEW01511.html.
118. Monoclonal Antibodies Directed to the Her-2 Receptor is a foundational patent to
the compound. U.S. Patent No. 5,677,171 (filed Aug. 5, 1994) (issued Oct. 14, 1997).
119. See Press Release, Genentech Biooncology, Genentech Announces Full Year and
Fourth
Quarter
2005
Results
(Jan.
10,
2006),
http://www.gene.com
/gene/news/pressreleases/display.do?method=detail&id=9287 (stating that United States
sales of Herceptin (Trastuzumab) increased fifty-six percent from $479.0 million in 2004 to
$747.2 million in 2005); see also Jennifer Barrett, No Longer a Death Sentence,

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2007

21

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 9

326

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 15:2

biotechnology companies, sued Genentech for patent infringement soon
after the product launch, alleging that its production of Herceptin infringed
the Chiron patent on Her-2 monoclonal antibodies.120 Chiron claimed that
the effective filing date of its own patent was 1984.121 The disadvantage of
an early filing date in a rapidly developing scientific field is that a patent
application may not have fully described the subsequent developments in
the field. Genentech alleged that the Chiron patent was invalid in that it did
not fully describe nor enable the production of the actual Herceptin
antibody because Herceptin is a chimeric (humanized) human/mouse
antibody engineered to minimize immune reactions in a patient, a design
that the Chiron patent claims did not cover.122 Formally, these statutory
defects are described in U.S. patent law as a lack of written description and
enablement.123 A jury determined that Chiron’s earliest filings did not
enable or describe patent claims that covered the humanized antibody,
meaning that the patent did not cover the Genentech product, and this
decision was affirmed by the Federal Circuit.124 Genentech, therefore,
survived this patent challenge to Herceptin.
There are patent-related issues that are surfacing as biotechnology
matures and as patients bring the same expectations of a competitive
pharmaceutical marketplace to the biotechnology medicines that they
encounter. The pricing of Herceptin has reflected the generally high prices
of new therapeutics developed from biotechnology and is currently priced
at approximately $48,000 per patient per year.125 This cost that has been
criticized by patient advocates and will likely impact its availability for the
treatment of early stage breast cancer, although major insurance companies
provide coverage for its use in the treatment of metastatic breast cancer.126
The market reality of a targeted therapy such as Herceptin is that the
NEWSWEEK, Oct. 25, 2005, at 2-3 (describing Herceptin as possibly the most important new
breast cancer treatment of the last few years).
120. Antigen-binding Sites of Antibody Molecules Specific for Cancer Antigens, U.S.
Patent No. 6,054,561 (filed June 7, 1995) (issued Apr. 25, 2000).
121. The significance of an earliest effective filing date of a patent is that only prior art
existing before that date can be used to defeat the patentability of the invention.
122. Chiron v. Genentech, 363 F.3d 1247, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
123. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
124. Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1247.
125. See BREAST CANCER ACTION NEWSLETTER #89, Herceptin Reports Reveal a Mixed
Bag, (Breast Cancer Action) January 2006, http://www.bcaction.org/Pages/
SearchablePages/2005Newsletters/Newsletter089H.html (“The annual cost of Herceptin,
manufactured by Genentech, is a whopping $48,000. BCA and other public health
advocates have expressed concerns over who will have access to this drug and what impact
the skyrocketing prices of biotech therapies will have on an already-troubled health care
system.”).
126. See Phillips, supra note 116, at 1275 (noting the availability of insurance coverage
for patients with metastatic cancer).
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scientific precision of the therapeutic compound can also narrow the target
population for the treatment, a factor that can increase price.
The demand for Herceptin and its relatively high price is a paradigmatic
illustration of the dilemma that accompanies the introduction of
biotechnology-derived pharmaceuticals into the health care system. The
Hatch-Waxman statutory framework which facilitates the development of
generic alternatives to brand-name conventional pharmaceuticals has been
discussed previously with respect to Taxol (Part II, supra) and Tamoxifen
(Part III, supra). To date, however, the FDA has not provided an
analogous generic approval pathway for biologics,127 although it has
considered how two monoclonal antibodies from separate manufacturers
would be evaluated for similar clinical effect.128 Of course, a generic
manufacturer can file a completely new BLA for the approval of a generic
biologic upon the expiration of a patent related to the brand-name product.
However, significant time for regulatory approval may elapse such that de
facto market exclusivity remains for the brand-name company, forestalling
the reduction in product cost that would be expected. The premise of
Hatch-Waxman expedited generic entry is that the latter market entrant can
rely on the clinical data submitted by the first entrant, if the products are
bioequivalent.129
The guarantee that a generic biologic will be
bioequivalent or identical to an approved brand-name product is less
assured for products produced by cellular processes, which are biologically
dynamic and may also rely on the use of proprietary materials. There is no
resolution yet, but the FDA has continued to gather input as it considers
how to facilitate the development of a meaningful generic market for
biotechnology medicines.130 Legal challenges have been filed, however,
that allege undue delay on the part of the FDA in formulating a generic
approval process.131 In addition, legislation has been introduced which
127. See David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical, Scientific and Legal issues
Relevant to Designing Approval Pathways for Generic Versions of Recombinant ProteinBased Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD DRUG L. J. 143-44 (2005).
Generic biologics are also called biogenerics or follow-on biologics.
128. See id. at 228-29.
129. See THOMAS, supra note 16, at 14. Antibodies are proteins, composed of amino
acids, so determinations of bioequivalence or biosimilarity will involve a consideration of
the degree of amino acid differences that can be tolerated between two compared proteins in
order to maintain clinical equivalence.
130. See FDA, Public Workshop: Scientific Considerations Related to Developing
Follow-On Protein Products, September 14–15, 2004, http://www.fda.gov/cder/
meeting/followOn/followOnPresentations.htm.
131. See The States of Kansas, Minnesota, Vermont, and Wisconsin, Citizen Petition,
2006P-0306 (Aug. 3, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets
/dockets/06p0306/06p-0306-cp00001-vol1.pdf. Sandoz challenged an undue delay by the
FDA is granting approval of its ANDA application to market Omnitrope, which is
recombinant human growth hormone. Sandoz, Inc. v. Leavitt, 427 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C.
2006).
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would set up a generic approval pathway for biologics.132 The visibility of
Herceptin, among other products, will certainly increase pressure on
regulatory authorities to expedite the development of generic alternatives,
and the breast cancer patient advocacy groups will likely play as significant
a role at this juncture as they did in the early development of Herceptin.133
The regulatory processes that emerge should ideally make it possible for
the generic product to appear before or at the expiration of patents relating
to the brand-name product, so that monopoly pricing does not unduly
persist. In that way, an original patent can act as a legitimate incentive for
innovation but not as a superfluous obstacle to market competition. When a
generic approval process is finally implemented, the patent conflicts over
Taxol and Tamoxifen, for example, should alert cancer patient advocates to
the vigilance required to ensure that a generic market for biologics is as
fully developed as the law contemplates.
Access issues that ensue from the high prices for biologics, such as
Herceptin, are likely to increase as cancer research assumes a distinct
molecular pedigree, resulting in the development of therapies that offer
clinical advantages due to precise targeting. Acute questions regarding
access arise where a specific patient population is identified as the optimal
beneficiaries of a particular therapy through pharmacogenomics. Herceptin
is a prominent example of this approach, where the patients with Her-2
positive tumors are those who can likely benefit from access to Herceptin.
The advent of pharmacogenetic considerations in cancer treatment will
increase pressure to make these biologics widely available, in order that the
therapeutic precision afforded by molecular oncology is fully exploited.
V. BRCA1 AND BRCA2 GENES
The molecular approach to cancer research resonates with a longstanding desire to identify any genetic predisposition to cancer. Identifying
any genetic basis of cancer presents the possibility of revealing risk in
affected populations and taking measures to reduce that risk. Many cancerrelated genes have been identified, so-called oncogenes, which can
transform a normal cell to a cancerous one, and so-called tumor suppressor
genes, which fail to block tumor development when mutations occur in
these genes.134
The work of geneticist Mary-Claire King and colleagues led to the
identification of a group of families that exhibit a high number of early-

132. See Access to Life-Saving Medicines Act, H.R. 6257, 109th Congress (2006)
(establishing an approval process for the FDA review of “comparable biological products”).
133. See BAZELL, supra note 18, at 115-132.
134. ALBERTS ET AL., supra note 4, at 1333.
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onset cases of breast and ovarian cancer. In 1997, King announced that
these families were being studied for an apparent genetic vulnerability to
these diseases, and that a possible gene of interest had been mapped to
chromosome 17.135 This announcement prompted an intense competition
among research groups to locate the specific gene that was responsible for
this early-onset form of these cancers. The first group to characterize the
full-length gene sequence was led by Mark Skolnick and colleagues at the
University of Utah who identified the specific gene on chromosome 17,
named BRCA1.136 The Skolnick group subsequently applied for a patent
on this DNA sequence and was awarded U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473 on
December 2, 1997.137 This patent was licensed to the Utah-based Myriad
Genetics, Inc. The work of King’s group at the University of California
was patented and licensed to OncorMed, Inc.138 Patent infringement
litigation subsequently ensued between Myriad and OncorMed, with
Myriad finally prevailing and purchasing the OncorMed patents, with the
result that Myriad gained the dominant U.S. patent position with respect to
the BRCA1 gene.139
Further research on breast cancer genetics subsequently identified a
second gene implicated in the heightened risk of breast and ovarian cancer
observed in families that carried mutations in the gene. It was identified as
BRCA2 and localized to chromosome 13; Myriad obtained patents to this
gene sequence as well.140
Soon after BRCA1 and BRCA2 were identified, in 1996, Myriad
introduced BRCAnalysis®, the first commercial genetic test to detect
mutations in the breast cancer genes. By 1999, Myriad was able to offer a
test that provided a full-length DNA sequence analysis.141 A number of
other American laboratories offered a breast cancer genetic test as part of
clinical research programs, with investigators offering different technical
testing methods, but these efforts were challenged by Myriad as the holder
135. Jeff M. Hall et al., Linkage of Early-Onset Familial Breast Cancer to Chromosome
17q21, 250 SCIENCE 1684 (1990).
136. Yoshio Miki et al., A Strong Candidate for the Breast and Ovarian Cancer
Susceptibility Gene, 266 SCIENCE 66 (1994).
137. Linked Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene, U.S. Patent No. 5,693,473
(filed June 7, 1995) (issued Dec. 2, 1997).
138. Genetic Markers for Breast, Ovarian, and Prostatic Cancer, U.S. Patent No.
5,622,829 (filed Apr. 19, 1995) (issued Apr. 22, 1997).
139. Bryn Williams-Jones, History of A Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and
Application of Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L. J. 123, 132-133 (2002). Myriad
holds at least eight U.S. patents to date related to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes; issued as
recently as U.S. Patent No. 5,837,492, Chromosome 13-Linked Breast Cancer Susceptibility
Gene, on November 17, 1998.
140. Richard Wooster et al., Identification of the Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene
BRCA2, 378 NATURE 789 (1995).
141. Williams-Jones, supra note 139, at 134.
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of the patents to the actual gene sequences.142 Myriad’s enforcement of its
patent rights require any licensees to submit clinical samples directly to the
Myriad laboratory for testing, a result that has been criticized on scientific
grounds because it unduly limits the development of multiple technical
approaches to genetic testing.143 A recent study by Mary-Claire King and
colleagues reported that twelve percent of the women who had received a
negative test result from commercial BRCA1 and BRCA2 testing in fact
possessed undetected cancer-predisposing mutations in at least one of these
genes.144 The implication of this work is that a scientific monopoly
facilitated by patent rights undermines the development of multiple
technical approaches, which collectively offer the most thorough testing
climate.145 This outcome can partly be traced to the existence of patent
rights, but it more precisely reflects choices by the patent holder in the
exercise of its rights. It is possible to imagine an alternative scenario,
where a patent on a DNA sequence is widely licensed for a reasonable fee
and with minimal restrictions.
Despite the dominance of Myriad over breast cancer testing in the United
States, private insurance will often pay for the test for individuals meeting
certain criteria.146 The cost will vary, as the first individual in a family to
142. Id. at 136. For example, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania who offered
BRCA testing received cease and desist letters from Myriad, threatening litigation unless
they took a license to the Myriad patents. Id. Myriad granted the NIH and the NCI at-cost
licenses (approximately $1200 per test). Id.
143. See id. at 139 (noting technical limits to Myriad testing methods identified by
researchers at the Institut Curie).
144. See Tom Walsh et al., Spectrum of Mutation in BRCA1 BRCA2, CHEK2, and TP53
in Families at High Risk of Breast Cancer, 295 JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION 1379, 1386 (2006) (“Clinical testing options for BRCA1 and BRCA2 are
limited in the United States. In contrast to genetic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2, genetic
testing for other cancer susceptibility genes (MSH2, MLH1, PTEM, TP53, etc.) are
available from numerous profit and not-for profit laboratories with a range of testing options
and prices.”).
145. See Vural Odzemir et al., Shifting Emphasis from Pharmacogenomics to
Theragnostics, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 942, 943 (2006) (“[T]he BRCA patents give
Myriad the ability to constrain research-oriented applications of BRCA patents and
particularly head-to-head comparisons of which genotyping methodology or test product is
most informative for clinical management of the susceptibility to breast cancer.”). A
contrasting climate exists for Her-2 testing, where Genentech has facilitated a robust set of
testing options, due to the fact that its Herceptin product is targeted to women with specific
types of cancers and obstacles to testing would reduce demand for the drug. See John H.
Barton, Emerging Issues in Patent Diagnostics, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 939, 940
(2006).
146. Information regarding access to the genetic tests is maintained by FORCE (Facing
Our Risk of Cancer Empowered), an advocacy group for women with genetic susceptibility
to breast cancer.
See FORCE:
Facing Our Risk of Cancer Empowered,
http://www.facingourrisk.org/finding_health_care/financial_help.html?PHPSESSID=62e28f
3a30cafa005a5d6fc3ba29057a (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (stating that “most insurance
companies will cover the cost of genetic testing in individuals who either have a personal
history or family history of cancer and who meet certain guidelines” and that similar criteria
apply to Medicare recipients). See generally Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology, American
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get genetic testing will likely undergo full-length sequencing of the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, but subsequent family members could undergo
more limited testing to determine whether they carry particular mutations
identified in the primary case.147
Patent rights are national in origin, and Myriad encountered a different
patent climate outside the U.S. Myriad obtained BRCA1 and BRCA2
patents in Canada, New Zealand, and the European Patent Office (EPO).148
There has been significant resistance to these patents in Europe, with
serious consequences for Myriad due to the fact that an opposition can be
filed against an EPO patent, an option not afforded to challengers of U.S.
patents.149 Oppositions have been filed against several of the Myriad EPO
patents, with the French research organization Institut Curie taking the
initiative.150 Myriad’s patent position was severely weakened when the
EPO revoked EP 699 754 and maintained EP 705 902 and EP 705 903 in
amended form, all of which pertain to BRCA1.151 More recently, Myriad
Society of Clinical Oncology Policy Statement Update: Genetic Testing for Cancer
Susceptibility, J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY June 15, 2003, at 7 (noting that Medicaid determines
coverage for genetic testing on a state by state basis, but that no information is available on
which states do and which states do not provide such coverage); LOVE & LINDSEY, supra
note 17, at 179 (estimating the cost for a BRCA test to cost approximately $3,000 for full
DNA sequence testing and $400 for specific mutation testing).
147. See Nancie Petrucelli et al., BRCA1 and BRCA2 Hereditary Breast/Ovarian
Cancer, GENEREVIEWS, Sept. 4, 1998, at 5-6, available at http://www.geneclinics.org/
servlet/access?id=8888891&key=vEb6tt6TXdJAY&fcn=y&fw=bJu4&filename=/reviewsea
rch/searchdz.html.
148. See Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive Control Over Predictive
Breast Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent Law and Public Policy:
A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J. 133
(2004). In the European Patent Office, Myriad was granted EP 699 754, EP 705 902, and
EP 705 903 (related to BRCA1) and EP 785 216, EP 858 467, and EP 1260 520 (related to
BRCA2).
149. See European Patent Convention art. 99, Oct. 5, 1973 (declaring that the grounds
for an opposition must be drawn from Articles 52 to 57 of the Convention). U.S. patent law
does not allow for an opposition to be filed by an unrelated third party; patent invalidity
determinations generally occur during infringement litigation between a patent owner and
an accused infringer. However, there are proposals for change. See H.R. 2795, Patent
Reform Act of 2005, § 324 (“The issues of invalidity that may be considered during the
opposition proceeding are double patenting and any of the requirements for patentability set
forth in sections 101, 102, 103, 112 and 251(d).”).
150. See Michael Balter, Transatlantic War Over BRCA1 Patent, 292 SCIENCE 1818
(2001) (noting that the Institut Curie filed an opposition to the first Myriad patent (EP 699
754) after its own research revealed the existence of a mutation in the BRCA1 gene that was
not detected by Myriad’s own testing).
151. EP 699 754 was revoked by the EPO in May, 2004, for a lack of inventive step
(EPC Article 56). See Press Release, European Patent Office, “Myriad/ Breast Cancer”
Gene Patent Revoked After Public Hearing (May 18, 2004), http://www.european-patentoffice.org/news/pressrel/2004_05_18_e.htm. Subsequently, the other BRCA1 patents have
been amended by the EPO (narrowed scope) following separate opposition challenges led
by the Institut Curie. See Press Release, Institut Curie, Another Victory for Opponents of
Patents Held by Myriad Genetics: European Patent Office Rejects the Essential Points of
BRCA1
Gene
Patents
(Jan.
31,
2005),
http://www.curie.fr/upload/presse/myriadpatents310105.pdf.
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has sustained an adverse result in an opposition filed by the Institut Curie
against its EP 785 216 (BRCA2).152 Myriad’s patent position in Europe
has been severely weakened by the series of oppositions, and it does not
dominate breast cancer genetic testing as it does in the United States. The
European Parliament passed a resolution that opposed the issuance of such
patents by the EPO.153
Patents on the breast cancer genes implicate the larger issue of the
patenting of DNA, which has been a controversial issue for years. A recent
report states that nearly twenty percent of all protein-coding human genes
have been patented, with the majority patented by private biotechnology
companies.154 Several lines of conflict result from this patenting. One is
whether such patents should be granted at all.155 Many commentators have
discussed the difficulties that DNA patents may pose for biomedical
research.156 A second question is whether mechanisms should be
established to ensure access to patented DNA sequences, which cannot be
invented around.157 A recent study concludes that patents on genes used in
152. The EPO press release stated: “The patent claim now relates to the use of a
particular nucleic acid carrying a mutation of the BRCA 2-gene which is associated with a
predisposition to breast cancer for in vitro-diagnosing of such a predisposition in AshkenaziJewish women.” See Press Release, European Patent Office, Patent on "Breast Cancer Gene
2" Patent Maintained in Amended Form after Public Hearing (June 29, 2005),
http://www.european-patentoffice.org/news/pressrel/2005_06_29 e.htm; see also Karen Iris
Tucker, Breast Cancer Gene Patent Causing a Furor, THE FORWARD, Aug. 5, 2005 (noting
the European Society of Human Genetics’ criticism of the patent that “[t]his is the first time
that a racial or ethnic group has been specifically singled out as a diagnostic target in a gene
patent claim”).
153. See Resolution on the Patenting of BRCA1 and BRCA2 (“breast cancer”) Genes,
EUR. PARL. DOC. (2001), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/ biotech/eu-brca.html
(noting that a monopoly on breast cancer genetic testing “could seriously impede or even
completely prevent the further use of existing cheaper and more effective tests for the breast
cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2”).
154. Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human
Genome, 310 SCIENCE 239 (2005). (referencing a study of 4,382 of the 23,688 genes in the
National Center for Biotechnology Information’s database that showed that sixty-three
percent of the patents are assigned to private firms and that, of the top ten gene patent
assignees, nine were based in the United States).
155. See E-mail from Fran Visco, President, National Breast Cancer Coalition, to Mark
Nagumo, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(Mar. 22, 2004), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ com/sol/comments/utilguide/nbcc.pdf
(stating that the practice of gene patenting is against the public interest and harmful to
research, in response to the PTO’s invitation for public comments on its decision of whether
to raise its standards for utility and written description, a decision with particular effects on
gene patents).
156. See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Genetics and the Law: Patenting the Human
Genome, 39 EMORY L.J. 721 (1990); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-Examining the Role of
Patents in Appropriating the Values of DNA Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783 (2000); Arti K.
Rai, Intellectual Property Rights In New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (1999);
Lori Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health
Needs, 2002 HOUS. J. L. & POL’Y 65 (2002); Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA
Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707 (2004).
157. Legislation was introduced (but not enacted) in the 107th Congress (H.R. 3967) that
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diagnostic testing have posed the most serious obstacle for researchers, but
notes that the acutely restrictive climate created by the Myriad BRCA1 and
BRCA2 patents is a “cautionary tale” for other gene patent holders, who
are disinclined to enforce their patents in a manner that disadvantages
intellectual development of the research field.158
Both researchers and patients have been affected by the management of
the Myriad patents. The monopoly position held by Myriad has
consequences for patient access and expense, and for research quality,
which is optimized when multiple investigators address the same research
problem. The continued dominance of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents,
especially in the United States, may have consequences for the role of
genetic testing in reducing the incidence of breast cancer and for the
confidence of patients in their results from existing commercial tests. The
ongoing scrutiny of DNA patenting by patient advocates and the scientific
community is certain to continue, and patent strategies that could inhibit
scientific progress or undermine patient confidence are likely to encounter
resistance.
CONCLUSION
Effective health care for women relies on a nexus of scientific, medical,
and legal regimes. This Article has examined an intersection of patent law
with women’s health issues in order to characterize the interface between
patent incentives and patent barriers. The analysis of patent conflicts that
have accompanied the development and dissemination of treatments and
diagnostic methods for breast cancer clearly illustrates the nexus between
intellectual property law and the achievement of an effective health regime
for women. Diverse legal scenarios reveal how the procurement and
stewardship of patents that control the use of important therapeutic and
diagnostic compounds impact the development of a competitive
pharmaceutical market and resulting patient access. The patent disputes
range from those that arise in a mature pharmaceutical market to those that
can only arise from new developments in biotechnology. An understanding
of patent issues is central to the efforts to improve health care for women in
order to identify points of leverage where advocacy can be effective. As

would have created a research exemption from infringement for research on genetic
sequence information and an infringement exemption for genetic diagnostic testing. See
also NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE LICENSING OF GENOMIC
INVENTIONS, 70 Fed. Reg. 18413, 18415 (April 11, 2005) (recommending careful
consideration of where incentives are required and therefore when genomic inventions
should be patented, and recommending licensing practices of such patents which facilitate
full access to DNA sequences).
158. Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene
Patenting Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1093 (2006).
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the Article demonstrates, such oversight may require familiarity with three
separate areas of the law: patent, food and drug, and antitrust law.
The case study of Taxol in Part II has implications for effective
government stewardship of its biomedical enterprise. Because of the
significant federal investment in biomedical research, Congress has
developed statutory mechanisms to transfer government research to the
private sector for commercialization, but Taxol illustrates that technology
transfer unaccompanied by public interest concerns can result in high
barriers to patient access despite initial taxpayer funding. There are
opportunities for government and citizen intervention when the patenting of
government-funded research does not translate into reasonably available
medical products, but significant political pressure is likely required to
activate the generally dormant procedures that contemplate interference
with existing patent rights in certain situations.
The recurring conflicts between brand-name and generic pharmaceutical
companies over the rights to market therapeutically significant compounds
emerge in this Article, as illustrated in Part II and Part III with respect to
Taxol and Tamoxifen. The interface between intellectual property and
antitrust law is highlighted by the enforcement actions from the FTC and
the states when antitrust liability is identified by potentially anticompetitive
arrangements between the brand-name and generic competitors. Although
some Hatch-Waxman abuses have been curbed, more vigilance is needed to
ensure that the contemplated transitions from brand-name to generic
markets proceed without delay. These are issues for patients as well as
third-party payers, as the cost of pharmaceuticals is often assumed by
insurers, whether government (Medicare, Medicaid) or private.
As cancer research became informed by the insights of molecular
biology, more recent controversies emerge over the patenting of therapeutic
products developed from biotechnology. The patenting disputes over
Herceptin, an antibody, and the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes illustrate these
dilemmas, as discussed in Part IV and Part V. Patent protection certainly
accelerated the development of Herceptin as a new therapeutic, and
although some patent infringement litigation has ensued, the patents remain
in force and allow legitimate market dominance to date. However, the high
price for Herceptin surely distinguishes the biologic therapeutic from more
conventional treatments for breast cancer, and illustrates an emerging
patent-related dilemma resulting from the success of biotechnology
medicines. Due to its relatively recent origin, the biotechnology revolution
in medicine has not yet generated reliable mechanisms to ensure that a
generic market develops when initial patent protections elapse, and the
acclaim for Herceptin will surely accelerate the attention to this issue.
Here, patient advocates will need to monitor the vigor of the FDA as it
responds to the demands for a generic approval process for biologics,
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making sure that such a system can truly speed the development of generic
alternatives, and that a regulatory process is not abused through patent
strategies, as has been observed in the Hatch-Waxman context.
The patenting and resulting market dominance over the use of the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes has significant consequences for the efforts to
optimize genetic testing, as the patents have constrained the scientific
research that could expand testing methodologies. These are access issues
for researchers, initially, but the consequences are real for patients who
may not receive the most accurate assessment of their genetic susceptibility
to breast cancer. Other breast-cancer related genes will be identified by
researchers, and the benefits and limitations of DNA patenting will
continue to be debated. There are proposals for ensuring access to patented
DNA sequences, such as a reasonable royalty structure or a direct research
exemption, and these mechanisms may receive more attention as the
pharmacogenomic era gets underway, which will greatly rely on genetic
testing. Despite widespread public concern about the role of patents in
mediating the availability of medical advances, there are significant
differences between the United States and Europe in the availability of
patent opposition procedures, illustrated by the legal challenges posed to
the European patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes. U.S. patent law
requires a robust patent opposition procedure, in order that all stakeholders,
such as breast cancer patient advocates, have the option to challenge
patents with legal defects.
Advocates for women’s health have played a significant role in the
patent issues discussed here, whether calling attention to abuses of the
Hatch-Waxman generic approval process, litigating antitrust claims against
collusive conduct by brand-name and generic companies, demanding
access equity to high-priced biologics, or participating in the standardsetting for the granting of DNA patents. Continued progress in women’s
health research and meaningful access for women to medical advances are
integral components of achieving full gender equity. To achieve these
goals, it will be necessary for all concerned with women’s health to
maintain a sophisticated understanding of the role that intellectual property
plays in the development and control of essential scientific and medical
resources.159

159. See Karen H. Rothenberg, New Perspectives for Teaching and Scholarship: The
Role of Gender in Law and Health Care, 54 MD. L. REV. 473, 487 (1995) (addressing the
need for feminist scholarship at the intersection of biomedical sciences and the law, noting
that “fruitful legal and policy analysis incorporate empirical research, feminist theory, and
interdisciplinary approaches”).
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